I can specify two variants of Ukrainian rescue road maps.
First is close cooperation with Russia. Does Russia need Ukraine? Yes, it does.
Russia’s desire to anchor Ukraine is driven by ethnic, historic perceptions (Russians see Ukrainians as their prodigal brothers, Kiev as the mother of Russian cities and Crimea as the Russian peninsular), economic expansionism (need to expand the Eurasian Union) and, of course, strategic military calculations (need for permanent military allies and/or buffer states).
There are, of course, tangible benefits that Russia could derive from Ukrainian participation in the Eurasian Union.
Ukraine represents a large and attractive market for the Russian economy. Russia would have to bear the burden of subsidizing Ukraine’s energy inefficient economy through steep gas discounts and other perks in order to draw and keep Ukraine in the union. Judging by the fact that Russia had to agree to buy $15 billion worth of Ukrainian bonds just to prevent its western neighbor from entering a free-trade agreement with EU, Ukraine’s participation in the Eurasian Union could put a serious strain on Russia’s budget, especially given the current stagnation of Russia’s own economy.
Second is the EU. Ukraine could adopt the Association Agreement with the EU, well short of membership.
Western countries might also think twice about whether they need a Ukraine firmly anchored to Brussels and/or Washington, given how divided the country is as well as the financial burden of subsidizing a nation of forty-five million which has learned to live in the post-Cold War by playing Western countries and Russia off each other to win concessions from both.
Today Merkel flirts with Ukraine but doesn't give any commitment to the country. With Greece she is tougher...
First is close cooperation with Russia. Does Russia need Ukraine? Yes, it does.
Russia’s desire to anchor Ukraine is driven by ethnic, historic perceptions (Russians see Ukrainians as their prodigal brothers, Kiev as the mother of Russian cities and Crimea as the Russian peninsular), economic expansionism (need to expand the Eurasian Union) and, of course, strategic military calculations (need for permanent military allies and/or buffer states).
There are, of course, tangible benefits that Russia could derive from Ukrainian participation in the Eurasian Union.
Ukraine represents a large and attractive market for the Russian economy. Russia would have to bear the burden of subsidizing Ukraine’s energy inefficient economy through steep gas discounts and other perks in order to draw and keep Ukraine in the union. Judging by the fact that Russia had to agree to buy $15 billion worth of Ukrainian bonds just to prevent its western neighbor from entering a free-trade agreement with EU, Ukraine’s participation in the Eurasian Union could put a serious strain on Russia’s budget, especially given the current stagnation of Russia’s own economy.
Second is the EU. Ukraine could adopt the Association Agreement with the EU, well short of membership.
Western countries might also think twice about whether they need a Ukraine firmly anchored to Brussels and/or Washington, given how divided the country is as well as the financial burden of subsidizing a nation of forty-five million which has learned to live in the post-Cold War by playing Western countries and Russia off each other to win concessions from both.
Today Merkel flirts with Ukraine but doesn't give any commitment to the country. With Greece she is tougher...