View Full Version : Noy's Essay Series #2- The European Security Dillemma

21-12-03, 03:20
Hey people

I've decided to put this essay up for people to read, and although it is not directly about Japan, the same problems exist in Japan as well. I hope you take the time to read it because it is very relevant to what is going on in Europe today, which few people are talking about. It does not have footnotes, but I can reference any statement if you wish. Ask any question you want about it, I'd be happy to answer or debate.

Merry Christmas (or happy holidays for anybody offended by the last statement)


21-12-03, 03:23
The European Security Dilemma.
A Revolution in European Foreign Affairs?

The development of a European foreign policy has been a difficult process that has occurred over the last three decades. It has reflected a variety of factors: the political landscape present in Europe, the institutions that will express its aims, and international system it must operate within. Many of the trends that exist today can be found in the inception of a European foreign policy in the early 1970s. In the last decade though, the effectiveness of the EU to articulate its strategy has increased exponentially. This has brought with it the questions about Europe�s role in the world. But the situation has been aggravated since September 11th, as many of the precepts that grounded the previous assumption about the EU�s security environment have shifted.
This article will examine the development of European Community security policy since the 1970s. As we will discover, the current debate in European Security policy is unlike any previous in both the affect it will have on the international system and on the European political entity. With the European Union�s emergence as an economic power of the first rank, it is a debate that must be resolved lest Europe remains a political pygmy. Undoubtedly though, it will bring hard questions to European leaders about the role they want the EU to play in the world. The inherent contradictions between militerization of foreign policy as represented by the Military power model and non alignment as represented by Civillian Power, as well as Europe�s relationship with the United States must be solved out if the EU ever hopes to posses a coherent effective foreign policy.
The Civilian Power Period (1970~1987)
The first debates about the international role of the European Union surfaced during the early 1970s as a result of the formation of the European Political Community (EPC). Before 1970, a common European security organization did not exist for Europe, outside of the Western European Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). By 1970 though, the WEU had become a hollow organization, existing only as a collective security treaty between its constituent members, the UK, Germany, France and Belgium. It was also limited to a narrow group of members, which made it unsuitable as a security organization for the EU. The lack of a political framework for political action made the need for a debate on a European Security strategy academic at best. Other attempts to imbue the European Communities with a security aspect also met with general failure, such as the 1954 Pleven Plan and the 1961 Fouchet plan. The situation changed with the Luxembourg Report of 1970 and the formation of the EPC in fall of 1970. The foundations of the EPC were basically a watered down version of the previous Fouchet Plan to increase political cooperation among European States.
The EPC was a unique organization, which reflected the political circumstances that were present. First, it was not officially part of the European Community, rather it existed as a separate organization that existed in parallel. This was to prevent the EPC from expanding its influence into Community areas, which had been the major sticking point for the failed Fouchet plan. Secondly, the EPC only dealt with foreign policy issues, and had a strict disavowal of a military aspect. Although France supported including a defence aspect, Atlanticist members (States that supported the US�s continued involvement in the European sphere) objected, as they feared that the organization would become a French ploy to disrupt NATO�s security hegemony in Europe. The framework had no legal or formal standing until 1987, consisting of regular meetings between the foreign ministers and political directors of the member states with decisions based on unanimity . The nature and structure of the EPC made effective cooperation on major issues difficult to achieve. Its limitation on defence and economic issues also handicapped its range of responses to security threats. Nevertheless, it still represented the start of a European Community security policy, and was the forefather to the Current Common Foreign and Security Policy.
With the formation of a European Political Community, the inevitable questions about its strategy and aims cropped up. The debate soon became dominated by the �Civilian Power Model�, which was formulated by Francois Duchene. The model advocated a promotion of democratic values as a foreign policy and held disdain for the application of military force to remedy security issues. He pointed to the success of European Integration in creating close relations among former combatants and wished to apply the model across the world.
Europe would be the first major area of the old World where the age old processes of war and indirect violence could be translated into something more in tune with the twentieth century notion of civilized politics. In such a context Western Europe could in a sense be one of the world�s first civilian centers of power .
The argument centered on the premise that stability for Europe would not be achieved by forming a European defence Identity, and by doing so Europe would regress back to the era of power politics. Rather, Duchene argued that Europe would be better serve its aims of stability by promoting the values and conditions that had created lasting peace within the European Community. His argument resonated on several themes that had surfaced during the early 1970s. The rise of D�tente between the US and the USSR, and West German Chancellor Willy Brant�s Ostpolitik with East Germany had thrown the whole notion of East vs West competition into question. The spectacular success of these initiatives where the traditional military instruments had failed for nearly two decades offered immense credibility to Duchene�s claims. These were heightened by the creation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1972, which had even opened up the possibility of European Unification outside of the superpower conflict. Practically, the concept of Civilian Power also fitted neatly with the nature of the EPC. The EPC range of instruments was limited to diplomatic demarches and coordination of national policy, which slotted in nicely with the tenets of Civilian Power. Since the EPC was barred from utilizing defence instruments, the Civilian Power Model was certainly an attainable strategy to utilize. If anything, the EPC limited the full implementation of the Civilian Power Model as Duchene envisioned economic statecraft as a major instrument for the promotion of peace.
Another factor for the Civilian Power Model attractiveness was that it could give the EPC a niche role within European security environment. Unlike NATO, which focused on the hard security issues such as military capabilities, Civilian Power�s focus was primarily on the soft side of security, utilizing diplomatic instruments to handle policies. This made the conjunction of the EPC and the Civilian power model attractive to Atlanticists such as the UK, Netherlands and Denmark. At the very least, the Civilian Power model would not usurp NATO�s position as a security apparatus, and possibly could contribute to European security if it could successfully engage Soviet Europe in political dialogue. By the same token, Civilian power was attractive to the Neutralist states within Europe. The EPC�s renunciation of a defence aspect gave it the perception of being apart from the bi-polar structures of the Cold War (like NATO or the Warsaw Pact). It existed as alternative framework for neutralist states to carry out their policies on the world stage, which could give them far more collective influence than individually possible. Furthermore, the Civilian Power model�s support for diplomatic solutions to crisis resolution gelled nicely with the general precepts of neutralism found within many Neutralist states.
The success of the EPC during this period was varied. The limited nature of cooperation ensured that there was little risk in the venture, but by the same token there was little in the way of spectacular success. This would prove to be the largest criticism of the framework�s nature. As Simon Nuttall pointed out;
... It was rather that too many people were not content with a cosy process moving at its own pace. In the place of declaratory diplomacy, they wanted action not reaction to events, they wanted to take the initiative. In other words they wanted not the coordination of national policies but a common foreign and security policy.
Furthermore, Civilian Power existence owed much to the US/NATO security guarantee. It allowed the European Community to assume a security identity divorced from the security-centered organization of NATO. If the EPC were to be charged with guaranteeing the security of Europe, in all likelihood, the organization would be forced to create a defence identity for Europe.
The early 1980s saw the first major challenges to the Civilian Power Model. Hedley Bull put forward the theory of the European Community as an international power of the first order that should acquire the military capabilities to defend its security interests independently. Bull�s argument reflected the unstable strategic situation of the period. There were significant questions about the commitment of the United States to the deterrence of Europe, in lieu of the Euromissile crisis. He thought it better that the European Community �should take steps towards making themselves more self �sufficient in defence and security�, rather than relying on the unpredictable security guarantee of the United States. Bull had essentially borrowed the basic tenets of the French Gaullist position and applied them to the rest of Europe. He also questioned the legitimacy of the Civilian Power Model as a viable security strategy for Europe. The continued soviet threat to western community necessitated a military deterrence of its own, which the model could not provide.
The idea of the European Communities becoming an independent security actor was difficult to realize at best though. The concept was firmly rejected by Atlanticist members for detaching Europe from the strength of the Atlantic alliance. By the same account, Civilian Power advocates rejected the notion that an increase in defence spending would further European security. Although Bull�s thesis was not received well at the time, the military power model would soon find greater relevance at the end of the decade.
Contradictions (1987~1998)
The end of the Cold War radically changed the security environment of Europe and with it some of the tenants of European security policy. In 1987, the Single European Act (SEA) formally introduced the EPC into treaty structure and augmented its institutional organs by the creation of a secretariat. But the EPC still suffered the same problems as before. These were rudely exposed in the coming years as the European Community was forced to take a �wait and see� approach to the rapidly unfolding events in Eastern Europe with the end of Communism. But along with the major changes in the security environment, the European Community itself was undergoing tremendous change as well. As a result of the SEA, the European Community decided to start negotiations on monetary and political union. Discussions on political union, especially in the areas of foreign policy were deeply affected by the events surrounding the collapse of the Soviet Union. In reviewing the events, the weakness of the EPC as a institution was evident, as well as the surprising effectiveness of the European Commission in tackling economic development issues. As the Iron Curtain fell, the European Commission was actively involved in directing the distribution of aid of the G24 group and through the EC�s own PHARE program. Therefore the need for �Consistency� among the various instruments of the soon to be named European Union, shaped the formation of what would be called the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) .
The institutional development of the CFSP reflected the varied and often equivocal aims of the EU�s member states. France�s institutional preference closely followed Bull�s Military Power model, while the UK, Portugal and Netherlands supported continued close links with the US. The Civilian Defence Model remained popular with neutralist states such as Denmark and Ireland. Negotiations would lead to a policy making structure that was based upon a series of compromises in order to satisfy all parties involved. The new institutional arrangement for European foreign policy did mark a qualitative advance from the previous EPC structure, but it still was limited in its instruments. Although the CFSP had recourse to economic instruments such as sanctions, the EU was still excluded from maintaining a defence identity. Defence issues were to be referred to a revitalized Western European Union, which existed as a parallel organization to the Union much like the EPC did for most of its history. The WEU had a secondary role as a bridge organization between the EU and NATO, to ensure that an institutional link existed between the EU and the Transatlantic Alliance.
The signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the European Union would once again significantly alter the European security strategy. But changes were already forthcoming due to the radical upheavals in the international system. The end of bi-polarity shattered the locus of the European Security threat from a definable single entity to a series of less serious but more unpredictable threats. To be fair NATO faced a similar situation, as it was left temporarily listless after the Soviet Union dissolved. Many commentators predicted the end of NATO, citing the Soviet threat provided a common issue on which Transatlantic relations were based. Hedley Bull�s Military Power Model grew in relevance, as the possibility of NATO�s irrelevance became an increasing possibility.
In the early 1990s, several situations helped focus and define the terms of the European security debate. Both the EU and NATO faced the task of ensuring the stability of the former Communist bloc. As mentioned above, the EU was at the forefront of efforts in the region, which gave the organization greater confidence as an international actor. The excellent work of the EU Commission in spreading democratic values through a mixture of tied aid and diplomatic engagement was seen to be a validation of basic tenets the Civilian Power Model. If Europe could replicate its success in other regions such as the Middle East or Africa, the need for a European military identity would be minimal. But the Civilian Power Model also faced several challenges that exposed weaknesses in the program.
The first major test of the CFSP�s crisis resolution capability was its response to the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia. The result of the EU�s response exposed the direct limitations of CFSP as a crisis management organization and at the same time partially discredited Civilian Power model. At first the EU�s response was alert and nimble, reacting robustly to the developing events. The member states were obviously buoyed by youthful enthusiasm for the new CFSP institutions, and attempted to handle the situation without recourse to UN or NATO instruments. Their enthusiasm though concealed deep flaws existed in the EU�s security policy. The most glaring was a lack of a coherent strategy to deal with the developing crisis. Member states differing policies towards the conflict and towards conflict resolution were exposed and manipulated. Germany�s insistent support for Slovenian and Croatian independence over the objection of most of the European Council was among the most visible examples of this incoherence. The EU�s direct response was limited to a group of military observers as well as a combination of diplomatic and economic measures including sanctions, which proved to be wholly inadequate for stabilizing the situation. Although a military response was considered within the WEU, differing opinions among members scuppered discussions. By August 1992, the EU response to the situation had collapsed, and it passed its responsibility over to the United Nations.
The near disastrous handling of the European Union�s crisis response in the Balkans, and the developing nature of international system had prompted a complete reevaluation of European Union security strategy. By 1992, NATO had solidified its security strategy with the �New Strategic Concept�(NSC). In the document, NATO assigned itself four tasks: �(1) To provide a stable security environment in Europe based on democratic institutions; ( (2), Serve as a transatlantic forum for allied consultations; (3) to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against NATO states; (4) to preserve the strategic balance in Europe.� As a result NSC, NATO would remain an important fixture within the European security architecture. This effectively undercut the any discussion about an independent security role from NATO, as outlined within the Military Power Model. Regardless, Europe was unable to provide such a capability anyway, as the debacle in Yugoslavia had demonstrated. However, as a result of the events in the early 1990s, the EU was successful in recalibrating its security strategy to the Post-Cold War environment. A new paradigm was emerged, often referred to as the Normative Power Model.
The Normative Power Model was very much a product of the post cold war events. Its roots can be found in Civilian Power Model, as it is based upon the same ideas of the diffusion of European values that Duchene argued for 1970. But it reflected a more nuanced approach to the idea of European norms.
The EU�s Normative power is manifested in its well-developed set of norms, which range from founding principles expressed in its treaties (liberty, democracy, rule of law, human rights) to objectives (social progress, anti-discrimination, sustainable development), as well as European Council conclusions such as Copenhagen criteria expressed in the EU charter of Fundamental Rights
Where the Normative Power model diverged from the Civilian Power model was in the applicability of military force to the European foreign policy. Without recourse to some sort of coercive capability beyond Economic sanctions, the EU�s ability to carry out crisis management would be limited. Yet many member states remained uncomfortable with the EU assuming a defence identity. Therefore in June 1992, WEU defence ministers met in Petersburg, Germany and agreed upon the Petersburg Tasks, which would serve as the primary defence strategy of the EU. The Petersburg tasks served to limit the EU�s Security strategy in two ways. The first was to prevent WEU from usurping NATO�s position on the European security architecture. It did not feature a collective defence clause that would duplicate NATO�s role. This was the primary concern of the Atlanticist nations, who wanted to guarantee NATO� primacy. In the same vein, it also limited the WEU straying too far from the precepts of Civilian Power, which was the concern of the Neutralist member states.
The Petersburg tasks themselves dedicated the WEU to crisis management operation, focusing on conflict prevention, peacekeeping and in extreme situations, peace enforcement. What the EU lacked though was an effective ability to carry out its security strategy. The WEU was ineffectual as a military capability, carrying out two token deployments in the Adriatic and the Persian Gulf in support of economic sanctions. As the 1990s progressed, opinions shifted towards the creation of a more effective EU defence identity. The turning point for the debate was the Srebrenica Massacre in July 1995. The event would horrify traditional opponents of EU defence identity and would recast the debate not in terms of European responsibility to resist war, but rather European responsibility to ensure that human rights standards should be upheld. Nowhere was this debate more acute than in Germany, where the massacre was compared to holocaust in character. The German Green party realigned itself along the lines of the Normative Power model, and removed their calls for complete pacifism in German foreign policy. The movement towards a Normative Power model for the EU would set the stage for the final period of EU defence strategy starting off with the creation of a EU defence capability.
A Normative Military Power? (1998~2003)
In 1998, the Kosovo crisis set into motion a complete revolution of European security affairs, of which the ramifications are still being felt. The crisis itself revealed to Atlanticists that the US might not always be available to underwrite European security; therefore an independent European defence identity may be necessary to assume a lead role in European Capabilities when NATO as a whole is not engaged . The Clinton Administration�s reluctance to get involved in the crisis even at the behest of several European leaders, would lead to the St. Malo conference in December 8th 1998. St. Malo would mark the inception of the European Security and Defence Policy, which would give the EU a true defence capability in its own right, unlike the parallel position the WEU. The early development of the ESDP engendered the same disagreements that the development of the CFSP faced in 1990. (. ) The ESDP certainly was birthed in the thinking of the Normative Power Model but the direction the EU member states would wanted to go with it was another question. Again Atlanticists pushed to ensure that the program did not usurp NATO but rather completed its capabilities. France resisted those plans, arguing the ESDP should have some autonomy from NATO. It later relented and later agreed to create links between the two organizations.
(.) Neutralist States, such as Nordic countries and Ireland, also greeted the development EU of a Military apparatus with some apprehension. They argued that the development of a defence capability, although necessary, could take away the EU�s emphasis on Civilian crisis management instruments. In an effort to remedy concerns, these states worked constructively by creating a civilian capability within the ESDP, including a rapidly deployable police unit and the launching of the �EU Program for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts.� Their efforts paid off as the development of the civilian aspects of crisis management surpassed developments on military aspects. The exceptional development of the civilian crisis management capability also resulted in the first official EU mission through the ESDP, the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina in 2001. The development of the security debate up until September 11th seemed destined to revolve around Atlanticism as the core of European security doctrine, but with some debate to the extent the Normative and Military power models should play a part of those classifications
Since September 11th 2001 though the EU security debate has taken on a new tone, one that has serious implications for the future of the union. The attacks themselves did not cause much of a change in European Security policy. Europeans long experience with terrorism is a likely reason for this as Europe already had stringent anti-terrorism measures before the attacks. Rather the change in European security policy had more to do with reacting to the changing security policy of the United States. Specifically, a divergence occurred in two areas. The first was the US�s response to the terrorist threat which focused completely on military instruments. It regarded terrorism as a technical issue that military instruments could solve. Europeans on the other hand saw terrorism as a cancer endemic to the international system, and was a manifestation of other problems in the international system such as: �civil wars against established Arab regimes territorial wars and conflicts over natural resources, and increasing global disparities over wealth and development.� The Civilian and Normative Power Models saw economic and diplomatic instruments as the best means to achieve long-term solutions for these problems.
In some respects the EU�s reliance on civilian instruments was seen as complementary to the US�s struggle against terrorism. Under such a scheme the US�s military capabilities would focus on attacking the direct terrorist threats to the world system while Europe�s civilian power would concentrate on preventing threats from emerging and rehabilitating post conflict areas. Robert Kagan referred to the division of labour as the US preparing dinner, and Europe cleans up the dishes. But Europeans are increasingly viewing such a division of labour as Europe�s passive support for the US foreign policies. As one French Diplomat put it in February 2002;
This complimentary is fine in the short term, but it cannot continue in the long term. The Europeans would be very very uncomfortable with this role. It would mean giving the US the Carte blanche for its military operations. The Europeans would be expected to by the Americans to pick up the pieces. And Frankly the US neither respects nor appreciates what the Europeans are doing. It would be a completely imbalanced relationship.�
The second major divergence was far more disconcerting to Europeans, which is the US�s apparent growing contempt for international laws and norms. These included the abrogation of the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty, the rejection of the International Criminal Court and The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, and most seriously the adoption of the preemptive strike doctrine for dealing with terrorist threats. As discussed earlier, the Normative Power Model was in part based upon the norms of international law as the guiding principles of European foreign policy. The United States� rejection of many of those laws led many individuals to question the utility of the transatlantic partnership. If the US does not respect the very laws and values Europeans hold dear, then what is the value of a close transatlantic relationship for European Foreign policy aims?
Whither the EU?
The reaction to the divergence of European and American Foreign policies has completely changed the security debate within Europe. Atlanticism has been dealt a serious blow as a precept of European security doctrine. In its stead Bull�s Military Power model has made resurgence, with France, Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium supporting an independent crisis management cell outside of NATO. The proposal was largely symbolic, as it would duplicate existing NATO facilities and allow the EU to plan missions without recourse to NATO assets. The reasoning for the promotion of an independent military capability was to ensure that European values were not misrepresented by American strategic aims. Undoubtedly, the Normative Power model and its predecessor the Civilian Power Model enjoy popularity in Europe. Yet by assuming a defence identity vis-�-vis the United States, the EU is undermining the enterprise of Civilian Power. To be fair though, the EU is nowhere near becoming a strategic competitor to the United States, and the roots of Atlanticism run deep. NATO still exists as the pinnacle of European security architecture. But if the United States does continue on its current post September 11th policies, Europeans will become gradually more resentful of its hegemony, and this will likely lead to increasing support for Europe to assume its own defence identity. Europe must reconcile the three pillars of its security strategy, Civilian, Military and Atlanticism before it can effectively articulate a coherent foreign policy. Europe must comprehend the implications of each pillar, otherwise it risks misrepresenting its own aims in the future.