a bushite? thats a bit snide, you obviously dont understand the politics of the united states government. i dont like bush anymore than anyone else that opposes his policies. funny how you are quick to turn this discussion into something personal. true china was a member of the league of nations, under a republican state, but the united states had the foresight to understand that this would not last. soviet influence within the ccp forshadowed the events that inevitably led to the collapse of the kmt. the united states knew this well in advance. are you forggeting again that the debate between you and i was started because of my view on american policies? do not mistake this as a biased opinion.
we the united states? are you implying that my opinion is based on american superiority? thats a load of bs. i am simply providing the objective position of the us policy makers during the 22 years the revolutionary war had its greatest impact on chinese government. the plain and simple fact is that the united states took into consideration that during the entire revolution, it could be viewed in essense, a complete quagmire of fuding factions, hardly a unified , "nationalist" country, with secure governmental structure. as for the rest of the world view, i cant speak for them.
an example of the forshadow >
American imperialism assisted Chiang by pouring in munitions and other supplies, and even direct military intervention in the transport of Kuomintang troops to Manchuria and North China by the US fleet and air force. Chiang had initial successes, but all in vain. He was leading a dying regime, more archaic than even the Czarist regime in Russia. So rotten was the regime that large parts of the supplies were sold by officials to the Stalinist armies for gold, and ministers and other officials in Chiang's government pocketed a great part of the dollars supplied for the war by America. Only the lesser part of the supplies and munitions actually reached the Nationalist troops at the front.
The military commanders ceaselessly intrigued against one another, as in all doomed regimes. Chiang, for example, starved General Fu Tso Yi, the only outstanding general who showed any real capacity on the Nationalist side, of supplies, for fear he might seek to replace him. The generals were outclassed by the superior strategy and tactics of the Red Army command.
However, the main reason for the victories of the Chinese Stalinists has been readily pointed out by Mao Tse Tung: the social questions involved. 'Land to the peasants,' as in the Russian revolution, sounded the death knell of feudal landowners and their corrupt regime. In large part, the Chinese Stalinists have carried out the agrarian revolution. That is the significant difference between the struggle in 1927 and now. It is this which has been responsible for the melting away of the armies which Chiang tried to use to crush the agrarian rebellion. Chiang's armies are composed of peasants - the poorest peasants at that - who have not enough money to escape conscription by bribing the officials. >
http://www.marxist.com/TUT/TUT4-1.html
chiang's oppression of the peasantry in the area Mao was driven from, Central and South China, in the 6,000-mile retreat to the mountain fastnesses around Yenan, where a 'soviet' republic was set up, had an indigenous population of around 10 million. this played a crucial role in support for mao, as chiang taxed them so heavily and burdened them with unbelievable treatment, conscripts for the red army were in no short supply, so, in responce to your comment on the 100,000 communists left at the end of this conflict is far from the actual number of active comminist supporters.
this entire argument started by my understanding of the position taken by the united states during this unstable revolution. not once have i tried to contradict the fact that for a short time, the "world view" of china was pointing in the direction of nationalism, a view that the united states did not legitimize, because of chiang's underhanded tactics and decision making, meaning, the united states understood that nationalism would not ferment to a stable form of government, instead concentrating on the eventual "outcome" of the revolutionary war. we remained indifferent to chinese policy until the war was over. while we tried to help chiang, it quickly became clear that he was a corrupt leader, and not to be trusted. with the soviet issue in play also, why do you think we had 2 strategic commanders advising mao, and chiang, at the same time? gen stillwell, and the other dope whos name i cant remember.
Mao Zedong was the chairman of the Communist Party of China from 1935 until his death. Under his leadership, it became the ruling party of mainland China as the result of its victory in the Chinese Civil War and the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949.
one more thing, i totally disagree with you about dropping atomic bombs on germany. it was "considered" just once, after realizing how powerful the weapon really was, then quickly dismissed because of the safety of our allies. our allies had more financial and internal interests in germany than we did. carpet bombing became the popular choice. i dont think the united states would have ever commited to dropping a nuke in western europe.