Germany lost the WWII before the Battle of Stalingrad or after that.

Germany lost the WWII before the Battle of Stalingrad or after that.


  • Total voters
    1

King Bardhyl

Banned
Messages
467
Reaction score
12
Points
0
The Battle of Stalingrad (23 August 1942 – 2 February 1943)[9][10][11][12] was a major battle of World War II in which Nazi Germany and its allies fought the Soviet Union for control of the city of Stalingrad (now Volgograd) in the south-western Soviet Union. Marked by constant close quarters combat and disregard for military and civilian casualties, it is amongst the bloodiest battles in the history of warfare. The heavy losses inflicted on the Wehrmacht make it arguably the most strategically decisive battle of the whole war.[13] It was a turning point in the European theatre of World War II–the German forces never regained the initiative in the East and withdrew a vast military force from the West to replace their losses.[2]
 
However, there are some scholars who argue that Germany had lost the war before this battle which is considered the most important of WWII.
 
Hitler made a big gamble when he invaded Belgium and started the Blitzkrieg.
Hitler should have lost that war, but he was lucky and the western allies made a lot of mistakes.
After that Hitler believed he was invincable.
Of course he was not.
Sending his troops that far east for the winter was selfdestruction.
 
Hitler made a big gamble when he invaded Belgium and started the Blitzkrieg.
Hitler should have lost that war, but he was lucky and the western allies made a lot of mistakes.
After that Hitler believed he was invincable.
Of course he was not.
Sending his troops that far east for the winter was selfdestruction.

I think that it was not question of gambling, German army was the best army in that specific moment of the war.
On May 10 the Phoney War ended with a sweeping German invasion of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and French Third Republic that bypassed French fortifications along the Maginot Line. After overrunning The Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, Germany turned against France, entering the country through the Ardennes on May 13—the French had made the fatal mistake of leaving this area almost totally undefended, believing its terrain to be impassable for tanks and other vehicles.
 
The blockade of the German harbours forced Hitler into action.
He played an all-or-nothing game by invading Belgium.
The allies left the Ardennes undefended, not expecting the German tanks to cross.
The allies should at least have put their airforce to work while the German tanks were in the Ardennes.
Overconfident as they were, the French had themselves surprised at Sedan.
Then in a panic, they made another mistake, putting their whole army to the defence of Paris and letting the German tanks roll towards Dunkerque.
It was total victory for Hitler.
 
The blockade of the German harbours forced Hitler into action.
He played an all-or-nothing game by invading Belgium.
The allies left the Ardennes undefended, not expecting the German tanks to cross.
The allies should at least have put their airforce to work while the German tanks were in the Ardennes.
Overconfident as they were, the French had themselves surprised at Sedan.
Then in a panic, they made another mistake, putting their whole army to the defence of Paris and letting the German tanks roll towards Dunkerque.
It was total victory for Hitler.

I think that happened otherwise.

In the Second World War, the Battle of France, also known as the Fall of France, was the successful German invasion of France and the Low Countries, beginning on 10 May 1940, defeating primarily French forces. The battle consisted of two main operations. In the first, Fall Gelb (Case Yellow), German armoured units pushed through the Ardennes and then along the Somme valley to cut off and surround the Allied units that had advanced into Belgium. When British and adjacent French forces were pushed back to the sea by the highly mobile and well-organized German operation, the British government decided to evacuate the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) as well as several French divisions at Dunkirk in Operation Dynamo.
After the withdrawal of the BEF, Germany launched a second operation, Fall Rot (Case Red), which was commenced on 5 June 1940. While the depleted French forces put up stiff initial resistance, German air superiority and armoured mobility overwhelmed the remaining French forces. German armour outflanked the Maginot Line and pushed deep into France with German forces arriving in an undefended Paris on 14 June. This caused a chaotic period of flight for the French government and effectively ended organized French military resistance. German commanders finally met with French officials on June 18 with the goal of the new French government being an armistice with Germany. Chief among the new government leaders was Marshal Philippe Pétain, newly appointed prime minister and one of the supporters of seeking an armistice.


However, my question has to do with something else:

Germany lost the WWII before the Battle of Stalingrad or after that
?
[h=2][/h][h=2][/h]
 
However, my question has to do with something else:

Germany lost the WWII before the Battle of Stalingrad or after that
?

I reckon, before that, Germany failed to give the finishing fatal blow to the Soviet union in Barbarossa, and was pulled back from Moscow, and entered into a war of attrition Germany was unable to win, with the Americans in the war as well. If Hitler would have made a greater attempt to draw the Japanese into Barbarossa, the USSR would have been crushed, Zhukov would have been unable to bring his Siberian division to Moscow and thus save the capital if they had to fend off the Japanese. But Hitler didn't ask the Japanese to join the war, worst still for him, he declared war on America, when the latter didn't declare war on the former, and with Japan not declaring war on Russia.
 
The opinion of different scholars at the time when the Germans were at the gates of Moscow they had again lost the War because the Soviet economy was producing more than the entire economy of the territories occupied by the Germans. The Germans had a modern industry with an advanced technologies and also a very strong army with a very high destructive power. But in the end who decided it was quantity, not quality.

To simplify a bit, German industry produced 100 tanks, Soviet industry produced 150 tanks. The German army can destroy 130 Soviet tanks, while the Red Army can destroy only 100 german tanks.

Of course the explanation is illustrative purpose, but things are so.

Despite the estimations held by Hitler and others in the German high command, the Soviet Union was by no means weak. Rapid industrialization in the 1930s had led to industrial output second only to that of the United States, and equal to Germany.[citation needed] Production of military equipment grew steadily, and in the pre-war years the economy became progressively more oriented toward military production. Mikhail Tukhachevsky, one of the prominent military theorists in tank warfare in the interwar period, lobbied the Kremlin for colossal investment in the resources required for the production of weapons in mass quantities. In 1930 he forwarded a memo to the Kremlin, pressing the case for "40,000 aircraft and 50,000 tanks".[74] In the early 1930s, a very modern operational doctrine for the Red Army was developed and promulgated in the 1936 field regulations, in the form of the Deep Battle concept. Defense expenditure also grew rapidly: by 1933 it had reached 12 percent of gross national product, from 5.2 percent in 1913; and by 1940 it stood at 18 percent.[75]

In some key weapons-systems, however, the Soviets had a considerable numerical advantage. In tanks, for example, the Red Army dominated overwhelmingly in numbers. They possessed 23,106,[83] of which about 12,782 were in the five Western Military Districts (three of which directly faced the German invasion front). Adolf Hitler later said "If I had known about the Russian tank's strength in 1941 I would not have attacked".[84] However, maintenance and readiness standards were very poor; ammunition and radios were in short supply, and many units lacked the trucks needed to carry supplies.
The German Wehrmacht had about 5,200 tanks overall, of which 3,350 were committed to the invasion. This yields a balance of immediately available tanks of about 4:1 in the Red Army's favor. However, the most advanced Soviet tank models, the T-34 and KV-1, were not available in large numbers early in the war, and only accounted for 7.2 percent of the total Soviet tank-force.

The Soviet numerical advantage in heavy equipment was also more than offset by the greatly superior training and readiness of German forces. The Soviet officer corps and high command had been massacred in Stalin's Great Purge (1936–1938). Out of 90 generals arrested, only six survived the purges, as did only 36 out of 180 divisional commanders, and just seven out of 57 army corps commanders. In total, some 30,000 Red Army personnel were executed,[86] while more were deported to Siberia and replaced with officers deemed more "politically reliable". Three out of the five pre-war marshals and about two-thirds of the corps and division commanders were shot. This often left younger, less experienced officers in their places. For example, in 1941, 75 percent of Red Army officers had held their posts for less than one year. The average Soviet corps commander was 12 years younger than the average German division commander. These officers tended to be very reluctant to take the initiative and often lacked the training necessary for their jobs.
The number of aircraft was also heavily in the Soviets' favor. However, Soviet aircraft were largely obsolete, and Soviet artillery lacked modern fire-control techniques.[

One of the wise actions of the Russians was the displacement of industry beyond the Ural.


Franz Halder wrote in his diary in 1941:[151]
The whole situation makes it increasingly plain that we have underestimated the Russian colossus...[Soviet] divisions are not armed and equipped according to our standards, and their tactical leadership is often poor. But there they are, and as we smash a dozen of them the Russians simply put up another dozen. The time factor favours them, as they are near their own resources, while we are moving farther and farther away from ours. And so our troops, sprawled over the immense front line, without depth, are subject to the incessant attacks of the enemy.[151]



Units involved
Axis armies[show]
Soviet armies[show]
Strength
Frontline strength (June 1941):
3.8 million personnel (Axis)[3][4] 4,300 tanks[5]
4,389 aircraft[6]
7,200 artillery pieces[4]
Frontline strength (June 1941):
2.68[3]–2.9 million personnel[7]
Overall strength (June 1941): 5,500,000 personnel[3]
15,000–25,000 tanks,
35,000-40,000 aircraft (11,357 combat ready on 22 June 1941)[8]




So what decides the fate of the war is the background.
 
Europe_before_Operation_Barbarossa%2C_1941_%28in_German%29.png
 
The opinion of different scholars at the time when the Germans were at the gates of Moscow they had again lost the War because the Soviet economy was producing more than the entire economy of the territories occupied by the Germans. The Germans had a modern industry with an advanced technologies and also a very strong army with a very high destructive power. But in the end who decided it was quantity, not quality.

To simplify a bit, German industry produced 100 tanks, Soviet industry produced 150 tanks. The German army can destroy 130 Soviet tanks, while the Red Army can destroy only 100 german tanks.

Of course the explanation is illustrative purpose, but things are so.

Despite the estimations held by Hitler and others in the German high command, the Soviet Union was by no means weak. Rapid industrialization in the 1930s had led to industrial output second only to that of the United States, and equal to Germany.[citation needed] Production of military equipment grew steadily, and in the pre-war years the economy became progressively more oriented toward military production. Mikhail Tukhachevsky, one of the prominent military theorists in tank warfare in the interwar period, lobbied the Kremlin for colossal investment in the resources required for the production of weapons in mass quantities. In 1930 he forwarded a memo to the Kremlin, pressing the case for "40,000 aircraft and 50,000 tanks".[74] In the early 1930s, a very modern operational doctrine for the Red Army was developed and promulgated in the 1936 field regulations, in the form of the Deep Battle concept. Defense expenditure also grew rapidly: by 1933 it had reached 12 percent of gross national product, from 5.2 percent in 1913; and by 1940 it stood at 18 percent.[75]

In some key weapons-systems, however, the Soviets had a considerable numerical advantage. In tanks, for example, the Red Army dominated overwhelmingly in numbers. They possessed 23,106,[83] of which about 12,782 were in the five Western Military Districts (three of which directly faced the German invasion front). Adolf Hitler later said "If I had known about the Russian tank's strength in 1941 I would not have attacked".[84] However, maintenance and readiness standards were very poor; ammunition and radios were in short supply, and many units lacked the trucks needed to carry supplies.
The German Wehrmacht had about 5,200 tanks overall, of which 3,350 were committed to the invasion. This yields a balance of immediately available tanks of about 4:1 in the Red Army's favor. However, the most advanced Soviet tank models, the T-34 and KV-1, were not available in large numbers early in the war, and only accounted for 7.2 percent of the total Soviet tank-force.

The Soviet numerical advantage in heavy equipment was also more than offset by the greatly superior training and readiness of German forces. The Soviet officer corps and high command had been massacred in Stalin's Great Purge (1936–1938). Out of 90 generals arrested, only six survived the purges, as did only 36 out of 180 divisional commanders, and just seven out of 57 army corps commanders. In total, some 30,000 Red Army personnel were executed,[86] while more were deported to Siberia and replaced with officers deemed more "politically reliable". Three out of the five pre-war marshals and about two-thirds of the corps and division commanders were shot. This often left younger, less experienced officers in their places. For example, in 1941, 75 percent of Red Army officers had held their posts for less than one year. The average Soviet corps commander was 12 years younger than the average German division commander. These officers tended to be very reluctant to take the initiative and often lacked the training necessary for their jobs.
The number of aircraft was also heavily in the Soviets' favor. However, Soviet aircraft were largely obsolete, and Soviet artillery lacked modern fire-control techniques.[

One of the wise actions of the Russians was the displacement of industry beyond the Ural.


Franz Halder wrote in his diary in 1941:[151]
The whole situation makes it increasingly plain that we have underestimated the Russian colossus...[Soviet] divisions are not armed and equipped according to our standards, and their tactical leadership is often poor. But there they are, and as we smash a dozen of them the Russians simply put up another dozen. The time factor favours them, as they are near their own resources, while we are moving farther and farther away from ours. And so our troops, sprawled over the immense front line, without depth, are subject to the incessant attacks of the enemy.[151]



Units involved
Axis armies[show]
Soviet armies[show]
Strength
Frontline strength (June 1941):
3.8 million personnel (Axis)[3][4] 4,300 tanks[5]
4,389 aircraft[6]
7,200 artillery pieces[4]
Frontline strength (June 1941):
2.68[3]–2.9 million personnel[7]
Overall strength (June 1941): 5,500,000 personnel[3]
15,000–25,000 tanks,
35,000-40,000 aircraft (11,357 combat ready on 22 June 1941)[8]




So what decides the fate of the war is the background.

Hitler broke the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. It was a mistake by an overconfident Hitler.
Otherwise, the war wouldn't have ended in 1945, Europe would propably have been divided for a long time in a nazist and a stalinist part for a long time in history.

Second mistake was to advance to fast. He should have consolidated his positions before winter and strike again the year after.
Now his tanks near Stalingrad and near the Kaukasus oilfields barely could move anymore because of lack of fuel.
 
ok my opinion,

germany lost the war for 1 reason,

she started the attack to Russia late,
why?
cause germans were forced to enter balkans,
that had as result loss of time, preparation for russian side and Allies,
little time till the heavy Russian winter, which was a rare very heavy, a coincidence of lack,

in Balkans although German pass and occupy, they had stucked forces, which they could use in Russian front,

the resistance in Balkans was heavy, and casualties, big,.
if NAZI did not attack balkans, it would easier, faster, and they might be before heavy winter in Moscow,

anyway, because i do not want to be missunderstood, this has nothing to with resistance or war abilities, of others,

simply it was the unpredicted varriant that led germans infront of GENERAL WINTEROFF very late,
 
There is a theory that Hitler had to attack Soviets. Because he was about to be attacked by Stalin, and had to go for surprise attack on his own.. I dont know if this is truth or just speculation.
 
There is a theory that Hitler had to attack Soviets. Because he was about to be attacked by Stalin, and had to go for surprise attack on his own.. I dont know if this is truth or just speculation.
I don't think Stalin would be in hiding for a week if he was ready for a war with Hitler. First day of war look like a complete surprise for Russians. They didn't even know if they should shoot in defence. There was no such order from Stalin.
 
Germany and Japan were defeated mainly because their overconfidence. Other than that they didn't have demographic, natural and industrial resources to win with whole word in such short time.
 
  • Like
Reactions: Ike
Germany and Japan were defeated mainly because their overconfidence. Other than that they didn't have demographic, natural and industrial resources to win with whole word in such short time.

I don`t agree. You may be overconfident for a day, a week, a month but after you have to faces with the reality. The war in poor words need money, industrial resources.
 
I don't think Stalin would be in hiding for a week if he was ready for a war with Hitler. First day of war look like a complete surprise for Russians. They didn't even know if they should shoot in defence. There was no such order from Stalin.
I googled it up. Viktor Suvorov was the author of the book. There is wiki article on the theory. As said by wiki scientists are undecided on the subject.
 
I don`t agree. You may be overconfident for a day, a week, a month but after you have to faces with the reality. The war in poor words need money, industrial resources.

if you face reality after you started the war, it's to late
 
I googled it up. Viktor Suvorov was the author of the book. There is wiki article on the theory. As said by wiki scientists are undecided on the subject.

Hitler's first goal was always to attack URSS. West campaign aimed extraction outside of the game of Frances and weakened GB, in order to have a free hand in the east.

Europe_before_Operation_Barbarossa%2C_1941_%28in_German%29.png


This map helps us in our discussion. Hitler might invade GB but at the end of the campaign he would be powerless to undertake another action. British, unlike the French will fight until the end. What he would benefit from this campaign if he would win?Others would benefit by sharing between them the British Empire, the first Japan.
While in the east was a state, 1/6 of the world, a whole continent, with endless underground and surface reserves.
 
if you face reality after you started the war, it's to late

I believe that in 1942 there was none that he doubted the victory of Germany. Of all the battles of Stalingrad is considered as the moment when the Germans except heavy losses, also lost the initiative.
By the spring of 1942, despite the failure of Operation Barbarossa to decisively defeat the Soviet Union in a single campaign, the war had been progressing well for the Germans: the U-Boat offensive in the Atlantic had been very successful and Rommel had just captured Tobruk.[16].522 In the east, they had stabilized their front in a line running from Leningrad in the north to Rostov in the south. There were a number of salients in the line where Soviet offensives had pushed the Germans back (notably to the northwest of Moscow and south of Kharkov) but these were not particularly threatening.

The Germans decided that their summer campaign in 1942 would be directed at the southern parts of the Soviet Union. The initial objectives in the region around Stalingrad were the destruction of the industrial capacity of the city and positioning forces to block the Volga River. The river was a key route between the Caspian Sea and northern Russia. Its capture would disrupt commercial river traffic of various commodities. It would also make the delivery of Lend Lease supplies via the Persian Corridor much more difficult.[15]:909

If I do not get the oil of Maikop and Grozny then I must finish [liquidieren; to kill off, liquidate] this war.
—Adolf Hitler[16].514
IF Germany would win in Stalingrad, it would take to the opponent, Baku oil fields.
 

This thread has been viewed 17005 times.

Back
Top